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This article contends that the ‘functional family’ model falters in the context 
of lesbian and gay intra-family  disputes. Functional family arguments have 
frequently been misused in disputes between separated lesbian mothers who are 
contesting issues around children and in disputes between lesbian mothers and 
known sperm donors/biological fathers. I argue that the rise of fathers’ rights 
movements and increasing emphasis on biological family gives both discursive and 
legal authority to essentialised, gendered and symbolic status claims made by 
biological  parents,  valorising   distant  biological  fathers  over  mother-led  family 
units, and separated biological mothers over non-biological mothers. 
Finding  that  the  functional  family   approach   cannot  usefully  resist  the 
current ideological climate, the article concludes with an exploration of an 








In recent years, in particular since the 1990s, lesbians and gay men have achieved 
major reforms granting some form of legal recognition to their couple and parenting 
relationships in most Western nations. Many of these recognition claims have drawn 
upon and integrated the sociological concept of ‘functional family’.1 The kernel of 
functional family claims in law is that rights should attach to, or flow from, the way a 
relationship functions rather than being limited by its legal form. 
 
The key claim of this article is that however successful functional family claims have 
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1 In particular see: Mossop v Department of Secretary of State, Treasury Board of Canada, Canadian Union of 
Professional  and  Technical Employees TD 6/89, April 13 1989 (unreported) and the influential dissent of 
L’Heureux Dubé J in Canada (Attorney General) v Mossop [1993] 1 SCR 554 as well the dissent of Ward LJ in 
Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd [1998] Ch 304 and the judgments of the majority at the House of 
Lords level: Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd [2001] 1 AC 27. These developments are discussed 
in Jenni Millbank, ‘The Role of Functional Family in Same-Sex Family Recognition Trends’ 20 Child and 





in the context of lesbian and gay intra-family disputes. I argue that the functional 
family model has been of limited utility, and indeed has been frequently misused, in 
disputes between separated lesbian mothers who are contesting issues around 
children.3  I also contend that in the current climate the functional family model is 
utterly vitiated in disputes between lesbian mothers and known sperm 
donors/biological fathers. These disputes take place at a time of unprecedented 
formal  equality  for,  and  social  acceptance  of,  same-sex  family  forms.  Yet  they 
coincide with other pervasive shifts in family law and policy – most notably the 
‘fathers’  rights’  movement  and  the  rise  of  (the  norm  of)  the  ‘eternal  biological 
 
family’.4  These two powerful trends enhance each other, as Susan Boyd has noted, 
because much of the fathers’ rights movement ‘seeks ways to enhance the legal status 
of fathers based on bio-genetic ties alone.’5 These trends run counter to, and indeed 
may render redundant, the focus on the caring work of family that is the core of the 
functional family model. I argue that the rise of fathers’ rights movements and 
increasing emphasis on biological family gives both discursive and legal authority to 
essentialised, gendered and symbolic status claims made by biological parents, 
valorising distant biological fathers over mother-led family units, and separated 
biological mothers over non-biological mothers. 
 
 
I conclude that the functional family approach cannot usefully resist the current 
ideological climate and so, without wishing to utterly succumb to it, I explore the 
alternative of framing a form of status claim for lesbian co-parents based on 
intentionality.   Functional   family   and   intentionality   are   inter-related:   shared 
intention and shared enterprise in planning a child and trying to conceive is the 
platform on which the caring work of functional family is later built. Ultimately I 
hope that the centring of intentionality in defining an enduring parental status for 
 
3 Many of these observations also apply to the far less common cases in which gay men who have been jointly 
raising a child separate and fall into dispute: see eg DWH v DJR [2007] AJ No 187; Davis v Kania 836 A2d 480 
(2003). 
4 This term was first coined by Selma Sevenhuijsen, see ‘Fatherhood and the Political Theory of Rights: 
Theoretical Perspectives of Feminism’ (1986) 14 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 329 at 335. See 
generally, Carol Smart and Bren Neale, Family Fragments (1999); Alison Diduck, Law’s Families (2004); Reg 
Graycar, ‘Law Reform by Frozen Chook: Family Law Reform for the New Millenium?’(2000) 24 Melbourne 
University Law Review 737. Janet Dolgin argues the ‘genetic family’ ‘further fragments the ideology within 
which families are understood, and challenges the presumption that society can safeguard traditional families or 
modern families – so-called families-of-choice – as units of love grounded in loyalty and solidarity 
commitment’: Dolgin, ‘Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation of the Ideology of the 
Family’ (2000) 32 Connecticut Law Review 523 at 543. 
5  Susan Boyd, ‘Gendering Legal Parenthood: Bio-Genetic Ties, Intentionality and Responsibility’ (2007) 25 
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 55. 
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lesbian mothers does not lead us into the privatised domain of contract law based on 
parties’ bargains. Rather, this model is based on an acknowledgement of the unique 
truth that for lesbian families the genesis of children is always conceiving of children; 
it is the intention to have children together that is the essence of family formation. 
The centring of intentionality is of course not without its own difficulties, but an 








Functional  family  claims  rest  on  a  performative  aspect,  that  is,  the  parties  are 
granted rights because of what they do in relation to one another, not because of the 
status of who they are or what manner of legal formality they have undertaken. This 
model falters in intra-family disputes because at the most basic level, there is simply 
no longer a united - functioning - functional family. Rather the court is confronted 
with conflicted - dysfunctional – individuals with contradictory accounts of who their 
family is, and was. 
 
 
This exposes the weakness of the fundamentally performative aspect of functional 
family: how does one address roles that, by the time of hearing, months or years after 
relationship breakdown, are no longer being performed, or no longer performed in 
the same way, or are being performed by others? These issues arise in numerous 
mother versus mother cases that usually concern disputes about co-mother contact 
with the child or children, who reside after relationship breakdown with the birth 
mother (more on this pattern later). In an alarming number of cases the birth mother 
has taken the position of absolutely denying the parental role of the co-mother.6 So 
we see birth mothers in court claiming that the co-mother, with whom they jointly 
planned, conceived and raised a child, is an ‘aunty’ or ‘extended family member’,7 
‘family friend’8 or ‘significant other’9 in relation to the child, or that she is a helpful 
 
 
6 Shelley Gavigan has neatly paraphrased this as the ‘she was just being a good sport’ argument: see Gavigan in 
‘A  Parent(ly)  Knot:  Can  Heather  have  two  Mommies?’ in  Didi  Herman  and  Carl  Stychin  (eds),  Legal 
Inversions: Lesbians, Gay Men and the Politics of Law (1995). It is important to acknowledge that co-mothers 
also use homophobic arguments denying the validity of lesbian relationships, for example through seeking to 
avoid child support obligations by denying their own parental status (characterised by Gavigan in the same piece 
as the ‘I was just being a good sport’ approach). Such cases appear from this research to be far fewer in number. 
7 Re G [2005] EWCA Civ 462 at para 11. 
8 See JAL v EPH, 682 A2d 1314 (1996). 
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source of former support to herself10 akin to a ‘roommate’, ‘best friend’11, ‘nanny’12 or 
 
‘baby sitter’;13  but not in any way the child’s other parent or other mother.14  ‘Real’, 
 
‘natural’, ‘biological’, ‘the’ and ‘only’ are words that often preface the birth mother’s 
self description in these cases.15 
 
 
Birth mothers frequently oppose the claim of a co-mother in a way that attacks the 
rights of all lesbian co-mothers rather than just her former partner. Literally dozens 
of the cases feature broad-based claims of birth mothers that parental status or 
parental responsibility can never vest in two women, or never in a non-biological 
mother, that parentage statutes apply exclusively to mothers and fathers, or that pre- 
existing legal mechanisms for the recognition of lesbian families such as consent 
orders through the courts are invalid.16 So for example, DEW (unsuccessfully) argued 
in 2004 in Maine that the co-mother with whom she had jointly parented for five 
years during the relationship and another five years post-separation was ‘an 
individual who is not related to [the] child biologically or by adoption’ who should 
therefore ‘never be eligible for an award of parental rights and responsibilities’ when 
there is a fit legal parent in existence.17 
 
 
Family law is state-based in the United States (US) and numerous jurisdictions do 
not permit claims to be brought by ‘non-parents’. This has led to a steady stream of 





9 See eg KGT v PD [2005] BCJ No 2935 in which the birth mother claims that she is the child’s ‘only mother 
and parent’, while the co-mother is a ‘significant other’ at para 19. 
10 The co-mother was characterised as a ‘mere helper’ in VC v MJB, 748 A2d 539 (2000) at 543. 
11 See eg TB v LRM, 753 A2d 873 (2000) at 886. 
12 See VC v MJB, 748 A2d 539 (2000) at 546. 
13 See eg In Re Cheyenne Jones, Ohio App LEXIS 2296 (2002) at para 3; AF v DLP, 771 A2d 692 (2001); KAM 
v MJR (1999) FLC 92-847. Such characterisations have led a number of judges to deny contact rights to co- 
mothers on the basis that to do so would open the floodgates to contact claims by nannies, babysitters and 
others: see eg Nancy S v Michele G, 228 Cal App 3d 831 (1991) at 841; dissent in VC v MJB 725 A2d 13 (1999) 
at 39; dissent in ENO v LMM, 711 NE2d 886 (1999) at 898. 
14 Indeed ‘nonparent’ and ‘stranger’ are terms in frequent use in the US cases: see eg White v Thompson (1999) 
11 SW3d 913; Wakeman v Dixon (2006) 921 So2d 669; Jones v Barlow (2007) 154 P3d 808. 
15 See eg TB v LRM (2000) 753 A2d 873 (natural mother); Re G [2005] EWCA Civ 462; DEW, H and J [2006] 
FMCA fam 514. See also the consent agreement in Rubano v DiCenzo (2000) 759 A2d 959 where the birth 
mother agreed to contact between the child and co-mother in exchange for a waiver to any claim to parental 
recognition: at 962. 
16  See Kristine H v Lisa R (2004) 120 Cal App 4th 143; In re ELMC (2004) 100 P3d 546; Valore v Bronicki 
(2005) Pa Dist & Cnty Dec LEXIS 433; Rubano v DiCenzo (2000) 759 A2d 959; LaChapelle v Mitten (2000) 
607 NW2d 151. See also Davis v Kania (2003) 836 A2d 480 involving a gay male couple. 
17 CEW v DEW (2004) 845 A2d 1146 at 1148 (emphasis added). 
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litigate for years even to have their claims heard.18  In recent years at least 17 US 
states have broadened their approach to standing in children’s cases to include 
psychological or de facto parents in lesbian families, yet threshold cases on standing 
(rather than merits) still dominate litigation in that country.19 In Australia, Canada 
and (in somewhat more limited circumstances) Britain, claims regarding children 
can be heard regardless of the parents’ formal legal status, and so more commonly 
we see cases argued on the merits in which birth mothers contend that contact 
should be at their discretion. It is also common for birth mothers to vehemently 
oppose any grant of parental responsibility (also known as guardianship) to applicant 
co-mother.20  Where is functional family here? Sometimes these are the very  same 
mothers who have previously petitioned the court for orders of joint parental 
responsibility,21 or for second parent adoption,22 regarding the same child or an older 
child born into the same relationship. 
 
 
At this juncture I pause to acknowledge that - as my family law students gently 
remind me when I rail against the use of homophobic arguments by lesbian litigants 
–no one behaves at their best in family court litigation. Parents frequently lay 
recriminations and abusive characterisations at each other’s door, with varying 
degrees of relevance,23  and will always be tempted (or pushed by their lawyers) to 




18 Julie Shapiro notes that in 2005 intra-lesbian cases actually exceeded other parenting and family law matters 
in which the National Center for Lesbian Rights was acting: Julie Shapiro, ‘A Lesbian Centered Critique of 
“Genetic Parenthood”’ (2006) 9 Journal of Gender, Race and Justice 591 at 601. Shapiro also notes that anti- 
lesbian organisations have intervened in some of this litigation in support of the biological mother. 
19      See    National    Centre    for    Lesbian    Rights    website    for    a    list    of    cases    by    jurisdiction: 
<http://nclrights.org/publications/states_custodycases.htm> accessed 1 June 2007 (last updated June 2006). 
20 Co-mothers are eligible for parental responsibility in the UK: in G v F [1998] 3 FCR 1 the court granted leave 
to apply; in Re G [2005] EWCA Civ 462 the co-mother was granted shared parental responsibility. In Canada: 
Buist v Greaves [1997] OJ No 2646 the application was denied; in KGT v PD [2005] BCJ No 2935 the court 
denied an adoption but did grant joint guardianship. Of the 25 US jurisdictions that have accepted de facto 
parental status for lesbian co-mothers, a much smaller number permit the possibility of shared parental 
responsibility and only a handful of the cases discussed here actually granted it: see eg LSK v HAN (2002) 813 
A2d 872; LaChapelle v Mitten (2000) 607 NW2d 151 (shared with both mothers and the sperm donor); Jacob v 
Shultz-Jacob (2007) WL 1240885 (Pa Super) (shared with both mothers and the sperm donor); Smith v Smith 
(2006) 893 A2d 934; In re ELMC (2004) 100 P3d 546. 
21 See eg: In re ELMC (2004) 100 P3d 546; Valore v Bronicki (2005) Pa Dist & Cnty Dec LEXIS 433; Kristine 
H v Lisa R (2004) 120 Cal App 4th 143; Kristine H v Lisa R (2005) 37 Cal 4th 156; Jones v Barlow (2007) 154 
P3d 808. 
22  See eg Annette F v Sharon S (2006) Cal App Unpub LEXIS 1099; Sharon S v Annette F (2003) 31 Cal4th 
417; In re Parentage  of AB (2005) 837 NE 2d 965; In re Parentage  of AB (2004) 818 NE2d 126; Lynda H v 
Diane TO (1998) 243 AD2d 24; LaChapelle v Mitten (2000) 607 NW2d 151; CM v CH (2004) 789 NYS2d 393. 
23 For example, past evidence of familial violence or neglect of child’s needs is highly relevant to a child’s best 
interests inquiry. 
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there is a world of difference between seeking to establish that the other parent is a 
bad or irresponsible parent whose care or company will be harmful to the child and 
actually claiming that the other parent is not a parent at all.24 
 
 
There are two possibilities here that I want to explore. First, there are a range of 
cases where functional family appears in a contorted or misused fashion, argued by 
the birth mother and/or received by the court in a way that invalidates lesbian-led 
family forms. Secondly there are those cases in which biology is so dominant that, 
even if  functional family is argued by the co-mother, or by mothers together in 
dispute with a donor, it is never viable as a frame of reference. 
 
 




A common misuse of the idea of functional family is that because it rests on the 
functions or roles that members play in relationship to each other, it therefore grants 
only a temporary status to non-biological parents. So, birth mothers claim that 
although the co-mother may have functioned as a parent in the past, now that the co- 
mother is no longer part of the household (and no longer has regular contact if the 
birth mother has opposed it) she has ceased to be a parent.25 This kind of argument 
seems particularly likely to be made, and to succeed, when children are very young at 
the time of separation. So, for example in the Australian case of H and J in 200626 
the mothers had separated when the child was 12 months old and the birth mother 







24  Moreover, birth mothers in the cases on standing are not just arguing that the co-mother should have no 
contact or no parental responsibility regarding their child: they are arguing that neither should co-mothers in all 
other lesbian families. See eg TB v LRM 786 A2d 913 (2001) in which the birth mother argues that the court 
should completely abandon the doctrine of loco parentis (at 917), and that exclusion of lesbian parents from 
adoption and  marriage  statutes  precludes the  co-mother  from  any  parental  rights  (at  918).  In  Matter  of 
Parentage of LB 122 P3d 161 (2005) the birth mother argued against any standing for psychological parents: at 
16. 
25 This argument was accepted in Guardianship of ZCW, 71 Cal App4th 524 (1999); Jones v Barlow 154 P3d 
808 (2007) and the first instance judgment in VC v MJB cited in VC v MJB 725 A2d 13 (1999) at 17. At first 
instance in VC because the co-mother had lived apart from the children for the first 2 of the 3 1/2 years of their 
lives she was held not to be a psychological parent: this was reversed on appeal. Note however that the passage 
of four years until judgment was the reason the Supreme Court of New Jersey would not grant co-mother 
parental responsibility, although she was ultimately granted contact: VC v MJB 748 A2d 539 (2000). 
26 H and J [2006] FMCA fam 514. 
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whatever significance lay in the relationships between [the child] and the [co- 
mother] (she asserts it was at best slight), now, given [the child’s] age and level 
of intellectual and cognitive development, that relationship no longer exists.27 
 
Another version of this argument is the position that the co-mother’s familial 
relationship with the child is not a stand-alone relationship, but was rather a 
relationship mediated by and contingent on a relationship with the birth mother 
herself.28 It is therefore worth noting that in many cases co-mothers are described by 
the court principally as the mother’s former partner, not as the child’s other parent.29 
While this may be explained as a consequence of the lack of language available, or as 
 
the court not wanting to use a term without accepted legal meaning, it nonetheless 
suggest that the co-mother’s claim is viewed as contingent on a relationship with the 
birth mother,30 who is centred as the ‘real’ mother. So for example, contrast the 
introduction  to  the  English  Court  of  Appeal  decision  in  Re  G  No  2  (granting 
residence with the co-mother): 
 
 








‘The present unhappy dispute is between the children’s mother and her former 
partner Ms CW’.32 
 
27 H and J [2006] FMCA fam 514 at para 12 (emphasis added).  See also the birth mother’s argument at para 69 
that, ‘whatever significance’ the relationship between co-mother and child in the past it is now ‘entirely 
evaporated’. 
28 This was explicitly argued in the same case, ‘It is the mother’s position that, from [the child’s perspective], 
given the absence of a genetic connection and the now concluded relationship  between [the women], the 
applicant can not be regarded as being a person of significance to [the child]’:  H and J [2006] FMCA fam 514 
para 12 (emphasis added). See also: TB v LRM, 753 A2d 873 (2000) at 890 arguing that contact cannot be in the 
child’s best interests because she objects to it, and characterising the co-mother in all of her grounds of appeal as 
‘a former lesbian lover’ of the ‘natural mother’ at 880-881 and Kristine H v Lisa R, 120 Cal App 4th 143 (2004) 
in which the birth mother argued that the court could not declare parentage for a ‘homosexual partner not 
biologically related to their partner’s child’ at 160. As with many of the other arguments discussed in this paper, 
this is not always accepted by the court, although it is not often singled out for criticism by the court. For a few 
exceptions see: KGT v PD [2005] BCJ No 2935 at paras 42-3; In re Parentage  of AB 818 NE2d 126 (2004) at 
133, and Kristine H v Lisa R 120 Cal App 4th 143 (2004) at 145-6. 
29 See eg Buist v Greaves [1997] OJ No 2646 at para 7. In TB the headnotes rather than the judgments use the 
terms ‘the girlfriend’ and ‘the appellants former lesbian lover’ at the Supreme and Superior Court levels 
respectively: TB v LRM, 786 A2d 913(2001); TB v LRM, 753 A2d 873 (2000). 
30 At an extreme end is Buist v Greaves where the court appears to suggest that the co-mother ought not have 
left the mother if she really cared about stability for child: Buist v Greaves [1997] OJ No 2646. See also dissent 
in Rubano v DiCenzo, 759 A2d 959 (2000) characterising the co-mother’s claim as ‘a petition for visitation by a 
person who neither has an adoptive nor biological relationship to the child…based solely upon a prior 
homosexual relationship with the biological mother’ at 990. 
31 Re G (No 2) [2006] EWCA Civ 372 at para 1 (emphasis added). CG is the birth mother, CW the co-mother. 
32 Re G [2006] 4 All ER 241 Lord Nicholls at para 2 (emphasis added). 
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Parental intention and functionality can blur easily in intra-lesbian disputes. So, 
while the birth mother of two children in VC v MJB acknowledged ‘having thought of 
the four of them as a family while the relationship was intact’, at trial ‘said she, the 
children and her new partner were a family now’.33  The birth mother, although in 
one sense framing a claim that the child’s other parent is whoever she says they are, 
for as long as she says they are, draws on functional family to argue that the co- 
mother is no longer being a parent, and she is not seen by the child as a parent.34 
Moreover she may claim that the co-mother has been replaced in her role by a new 
 
partner who is similarly biologically unrelated to the child but who trumps her 
because she is now doing the caring work previously undertaken by the co-mother.35 
If the court construes the co-mother as a step-parent from the outset then it is not a 
huge leap to see her role as fundamentally temporary36 and inter-changeable with a 
new adult (who may indeed perform it better). 
 
 
Why, exactly, should the co-mother not be equated with the ‘new’ step-parent?37 
 
Addressing this question makes it clear that intention and functionality are likewise 
blurred in the claims of co-mothers: she is a parent not just because she acts as a 
parent  but  because she  and  the  birth  mother  both  intended her  to  be  one  and 
because they chose to conceive a family together. Yet in the context of a family law 
dispute,  where  the  child’s  best  interests  test  is  paramount  and  child-centred 
discourse ubiquitous, claiming a novel parental status based on past intention is 
extremely  difficult,  if  not  impossible.38   Thus  intention  is  de-emphasised,  often 




33 VC v MJB, 725 A2d 13 (1999) quoting trial judgment at 16. 
34  In VC v MJB, 748 A2d 539 (2000) the birth mother’s expert ‘noted that the children viewed MJB’s new 
partner as a current member of their family’ at 545. 
35 See eg Re G [2005] EWCA Civ 462; KGT v PD [2005] BCJ No 2935. 
36 See the argument of the birth mother in AB, rejected by the court, that the co-mother is akin to a temporary 
foster parent seeking to prevent the return of a child to natural parents: In re Parentage  of AB 818 NE2d 126 
(2004) at 133. 
37 See SF v MD, 751 A2d 9 (2000) where the functional family claim of co-mothers is equated with stepparent 
visitation: at 15. Note that in some claims, co-mothers have been explicitly held to have fewer rights than step- 
parents: see eg White v Thompson 11 SW3d 913 (1999). 
38 ‘In my view, in terms of the applicable legislation, the applicant cannot claim to be significant to [the child] 
merely because the applicant and the mother were involved in a significant relationship, at the time of [the 
child]s] conception and afterwards’: H and J [2006] FMCA fam 514 at para 62. 
39 ‘In my view, her claim to be of significance to [the child] can only be based on what [has been] described as 
‘past performance’’: H and J [2006] FMCA fam 514 at para 61 and see references to past provision of care, 
previous welfare and past significance in para 63. 
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a history of shared care to ground their claims, must somehow convince the court 
that this relationship of past care is not past in the sense of being at an end; they 
must translate it into a claim of future significance.40  This is often extremely difficult 
to do in the absence of any general social validation of the co-mother’s role.41 
 
 
In the US many jurisdictions have adopted a bifurcated hearing in intra-lesbian 
disputes: firstly to determine whether the co-mother meets the standard of de facto 
or psychological parent to establish standing, and then, if so, to undertake a child’s 
best interests inquiry on the issues. While judges in such cases have adopted the 
language of functional family and endorsed the role of law as reflecting rather than 
dictating  family  reality;42    this  is  quite  simply  a  very  heavy  evidentiary  (and 
economic) burden for co-mothers to bear.43 Co-mothers have failed to satisfy the 
standard of functional parent, for example, in cases where they lived with the baby 
for only four months prior to relationship breakdown,44 and where the couple were 
closeted  and  so  had  not  presented  to  the  world  at  large  (or  on  any  official 






40 See eg TB where after five years of litigation the co-mother had conclusively established standing based on 
past care but the matter was remanded for rehearing on the basis that there had been insufficient investigation 
into whether continued contact would be in the child’s best interests into the future: TB v LRM (2001) 786 A2d 
913; TB v LRM, 786 A2d 913(2001). In Re G [2005] EWCA Civ 462 it is interesting that the reframing of 
intention was undertaken by the court welfare officer, who characterised the importance of the co-mother to the 
children in terms of ensuring that they ‘grow up with a better understanding of the complexity of their own 
identity’ at para 9. However even in this quite positive decision there are a number of references to the co- 
mother’s role ‘historically’ (although she is given importance as trustee of the family history that the birth 
mother is now seeking to deny). 
41 Indeed one birth mother’s expert testified that ‘the loss of VC [the co-mother] was not comparable to the loss 
of a parent in a heterosexual divorce because, in a heterosexual relationship, society would reinforce the 
expectation for a relationship to continue between a child and parent post-divorce, whereas no similar 
expectation would exist for the relationship between VC and the children’:  VC v MJB 725 A2d 13 (1999) at 17 
quoting trial judgment. 
42 See eg the Supreme Court of New Jersey: ‘Once the parent child bond is forged, the rights and duties of the 
parties should be crafted to reflect that reality’ VC v MJB 748 A2d 539 (2000) at 555, and concurring judgment 
‘it is reality and not mere legality that should dictate who can be denominated as a psychological parent’ at 558. 
43 In VC v MJB 748 A2d 539 (2000) the Supreme Court of New Jersey acknowledged that the first phase would 
almost always require expert testimony to establish the existence of a psychological parent-child relationship: at 
553. The Maryland Court of Appeals has held that the person claming de facto parental status must bear the 
burden of pleading, production of evidence and persuasion: Marks v Kahlor Md App LEXIS 252 (2006) at 15. 
Some jurisdictions hold that de facto parents do not attain an equal footing with a biological or legal parent, for 
instance there is a presumption of custody to the biological or adoptive parent or the de facto parent is limited to 
contact and cannot claim residence or shared parental responsibility, or they must demonstrate compelling 
interest such as actual or threatened emotional harm to the child to gain standing. 
44 AF v DLP 771 A2d 692 (2001). 
45 AF v DLP 771 A2d 692 (2001) at 699. She was not allowed to introduce expert evidence as to the parent-child 
bond as she had failed the threshold standing question. 
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and not the length of the relationship between co-mother and child that is crucial,46 
the   American  Law   Institute  Principles,  which  have  been   very   influential  in 
supporting the ‘de facto parent’ standard,47 actually reintroduced a quantitative focus 
by defining a de facto parent as someone who has lived with the child for ‘not less 
than two years’ and who has ‘regularly performed a share of the caretaking functions 
at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived’.48 
 
 
In the case of AH in 2006 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed a decision 
that a co-mother who had lived with the child for the first 18 months of his life, but 
who was a career-oriented primary breadwinner (who had not proceeded with a 
second parent adoption available in that state), did not meet the de facto parent 
standard.49 As a result the co-mother was denied standing to seek contact with her 
child after three years of litigation.  It is very striking that the Chief Justice of the 
same Court which had first granted same-sex marriage in Goodridge, a judgment 
replete with references to gay and lesbian parenting and family forms,50  two years 
later in AH should so vigorously refuse: 
‘the  plaintiff’s  invitation  to  erase  the  distinctions  between  biological  and 
adoptive parents, on the one hand, and de facto parents on the other, and to … 
intrude into the private realm of an autonomous, if nonintact, family’.51 
 
 
It  is  also  apparent  that  mothers  whose  relationships  break  down  during  the 
pregnancy have  no  chance of  meeting the  functional family standard because it 
focuses on the post-birth period, yet the baby was still intended to be the child of 
 
46 In JAL the Superior Court of Pennsylvania rejected the birth mother’s argument that the co-mother could not 
qualify because she had only lived with the child for first 10 months of the child’s life: JAL v EPH 682 A2d 
1314 (1996). See also VC v MJB 748 A2d 539 (2000) (where the co-mother had lived with the children for two 
years and apart from them for the next four years), the Supreme Court of New Jersey stressed that in assessing 
the parent-child bond the crucial aspect is the nature of the relationship not the quantity of time: at 553. 
47 Cited with approval in Rubano v DiCenzo 759 A2d 959 (2000) at 974-5, and an earlier draft in ENO v LMM 
711 NE2d 886 (1999) at 891. See critique by Richard Storrow, ‘Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted 
Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parenthood’ (2002) 53 Hastings Law Journal 597 at 664-677. 
48 American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (2002) 2.03(1)(c), emphasis added, cited 
in AH v MP 857 NE2d 1061 (2006). Not all jurisdictions have used this standard: see eg Vermont, which took 
into account the ‘expectation and intent’ of both parties that the co-mother would be a parent and the joint 
decision as to the manner of conception in addition to shared parenting after birth in Miller-Jenkins v Miller- 
Jenkins, 912 A2d 951 (2006) at para 56. 
49 AH v MP 857 NE2d 1061 (2006). Massachusetts was one of the earliest states to grant de facto parental status: 
see ENO v LMM 711 NE2d 886 (1999). 
50  Goodridge v Dept of Health 798 NE2d 941 (2003); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate 802 NE2d 565 
(2004): the majority judgments in both were authored by Marshall CJ. 
51 AH v MP 857 NE2d 1061 (2006) at 1065. In Goodridge v Dept of Health 798 NE2d 941 (2003) Marshall CJ 
noted that, ‘While establishing the parentage of children as soon as possible is crucial to the safety and welfare 
of children… same-sex couples must undergo the sometimes lengthy and intrusive process of second-parent 
adoption to establish their joint parentage’ at 963. 
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each.52 I acknowledge here that such a co-mothers’ claim to parental status in such 
circumstances may lead to some uncomfortable resonances with ‘fathers’ rights’ 
claims (where, for example distant or uninvolved biological fathers assert a 
permanent irreplaceable status because they are ‘the father’). Carol Smart long ago 
identified the marked disjuncture between mothers caring for and fathers caring 
about children and many feminists have argued that the legal system has erred in 
placing an equal value on these kinds of care.53  In order to value women’s caring 
work in heterosexual families, ‘mothers’ rights’ have principally been framed through 
a primary caregiver presumption by feminist family law scholars since the 1980s.54 
 
 
The primary caregiver presumption connects to functional family in the sense that it 
promotes a model of dispute resolution for family claims that centres the unequal 
way in which (heterosexual) families functioned prior to separation over the claims 
to  formal  equality  by  the  legal/biological parents.  The  primary  caregiver 
presumption was adopted in a very limited number of jurisdictions and has now been 
completely overtaken in most jurisdictions by reforms vigorously promoting (indeed, 
some would say, compelling) the norm of on-going shared post-separation parenting 
in heterosexual families.55 It is ironic then to note the currency of primary caregiver 
arguments in intra-lesbian cases.56  In stark contrast to the cases of lesbian parents 
claiming familial recognition from the state, where references to the egalitarian ideal 
of shared and equal parenting are ubiquitous, the intra-lesbian cases burst with birth 








52See TF v BL 813 NE2d 1244 (2004) where the birth mother sought child support which was denied by the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts on the basis that although there was an agreement to jointly parent the child 
this amounted to a contract in breach of public policy as ‘parenthood by contract’ is not recognised in that state. 
53 See eg Carol Smart, ‘Losing the Struggle for Another Voice: The Case of Family Law’ (1995) 18 Dalhousie 
Law Journal 173 and ‘The Legal and Moral Ordering of Child Custody’ (1991) 18 Journal of Law and Society 
485. 
54   See  for  example, Susan Boyd, Helen Rhoades &  Kate Burns, ‘The  Politics of  the  Primary Caregiver 
Presumption: A Conversation’ (1999) 13 Australian Journal of Family Law 233. 
55   See  Susan  Boyd  &  Helen  Rhoades,  ‘Reforming  Custody  Laws:  A  Comparative  Study’  (2004)  18 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 119 and Boyd, Rhoades & Burns, ibid. 
56 While the ALI principles including ‘a share of caretaking functions as least as great as that of the parent’ have 
had some influence, they are in fact cited in only a minority of the US cases where primary caregiver is argued 
by the birth mother. Note also that Kentucky has a statutory definition of de facto parent requiring them to be 
‘the primary caregiver’: a lesbian co-parent and primary financial supporter of an adopted child for six years 
was held not to meet this standard in BF v TD, Ky App LEXIS 95 (2005), and so was denied standing to seek 
contact. 
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of domestic labour and repeated reference to the birth mother as primary caregiver.57 
 
So for example in KGT the birth mother argued that: 
 
she  as  [the  child’s]  birth  mother  and  the  person  who  has  been  primarily 
responsible for her care, is [the child’s] only mother and parent’58 
 
 
The use of primary caregiver arguments and rhetoric in intra-lesbian disputes is, in 
the vast majority of cases, completely inappropriate for two reasons. First it uses a 
model based on vast disparities in care in heterosexual families and applies it to 
lesbian families in which there are, generally speaking, quite minor disparities in 
care. The sociological literature on lesbian-led families formed through assisted 
conception shows a common ideal of shared care, which although not always 
completely achieved,59 is far greater in fact than that generally found in heterosexual 
families.60 The research demonstrates that co-mothers are far more likely to take 
significant periods of time off work following the birth of a child, to engage in part- 
time work thereafter, and to undertake an equitable share of household and child 
care labour throughout the child’s life than fathers are.61 Where inequality in the 
provision of child care occurs it is also likely to be identified by lesbian parents as an 
issue in the parties’ division of labour, and may be ‘compensated’ for at other times 
or in other ways.62  In this sense, L’Heureux Dubé’s remark in Mossop that it is 
‘possible that a functional model may be used to subject non-traditional families to a 
 




57 See eg Buist v Greaves [1997] OJ No 2646. 
58 KGT v PD [2005] BCJ No 2935 at para 19. 
59  For example, Gillian Dunne found that co-mothers are more likely to undertake full-time work than birth 
mothers in lesbian parenting couples: Gillian Dunne, ‘Opting into Motherhood: Lesbians Blurring the 
Boundaries and Transforming the Meaning of Parenthood and Kinship’ (2000) 14 Gender and Society 11. 
60  Patterson and Chan give an overview of several US and UK studies through the 1990s of families where 
lesbian couples had planned and borne children together and conclude that: ‘Lesbian couples, by and large, 
reported being able to negotiate their division of labor equitably. In addition, lesbian non-biological mothers 
were consistently described as more involved than heterosexual fathers with their children’: Charlotte Patterson 
and Raymond Chan, ‘Gay Fathers’ in Michael Lamb (ed), The Role of the Father in Child Development (3rd ed, 
1997) at 203. 
61 For example in Golombok and Tasker’s study, birth mothers reported that over 90% of the co-mothers were at 
least as involved as themselves in parenting, compared with 47% of fathers in DI families and 37% of fathers in 
non-DI families: see, Susan Golombok and Fiona Tasker, ‘The Role of Co-Mothers in Planned Lesbian-Led 
Families’ in Gillian Dunne (ed), Living Difference: Lesbian Perspective on Work and Family Life (1998) at 59. 
See also Nanette Gartrell, Amy Banks, Jean Hamilton, Nancy Reed, Holly Bishop and Carla Rodas, ‘The 
National Lesbian Family Study: 2. Interviews with Mothers of Toddlers’ (1999) 69 American Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry  362;  Maureen  Sullivan,  ‘Rozzie  and  Harriet:  Gender  and  Family  Patterns  of  Lesbian 
Coparents’ (1996) 10 Gender and Society 747 – these and many other studies are discussed in Jenni Millbank, 
‘From Here to Maternity: A Review of the Research on Lesbian and Gay Families’ (2003) 38   Australian 
Journal of Social Issues 541. 
62 See for example, Sullivan, ibid. 
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norm’63 appears prophetic.64 (It is also notable that in cases where the co-mother has 
undertaken  the  majority  of  the  child’s  early  care,  the  term  rarely  appears.65) 
Secondly, in the intra-lesbian cases, primary caregiver arguments have been made 
not, as was intended, as the basis for claims to residence with the child (where it is - 
in my view rightly - a way of arguing for stability of attachment and routine for the 
child post-separation). 66 Rather, birth mothers have raised primary caregiver claims 
in order to deny parental responsibility, parental status, or even regular weekend 
contact to the co-mother. 
 
 
While these arguments are not always given great credence by decision-makers,67 I 
find it troubling that they are made at all. Such claims reaffirm the idea that the co- 
mother’s parental status must be earned, and that it is fundamentally temporary. 
They also suggest that the co-mother’s contribution is only ever quantitative, that she 
cannot offer anything qualitatively different to the child in addition to that offered by 
the (primary caregiver) birth mother:68  in essence, that only one woman needs to 
perform the function of mother.69 This aspect of the argument appears to have had 
more purchase in the cases: there is a marked reluctance in the available judgments 
to use the gendered term ‘mother’ for both women.70 So while the birth mother will 
frequently be referred as ‘the’  mother, the co-mother is often referred to  as the 




63 Canada (Attorney General) v Mossop [1993] 1 SCR 554 at 638. 
64  For a rare acknowledgement that co-mothers are being held to a far higher standard of care than fathers 
through the invocation of primary caregiver arguments: see the dissent in Jones v Barlow 154 P3d 808 (2007). 
65 See G v F [1998] 3 FCR 1 where primary care of the child for two years was not called that and the adult was 
titled a ‘quasi parent’. There is a single reference to fact that co-mother was primary caretaker for child until 
school age in Matter of Parentage of LB 89 P3d 271 (2004) at 275. In Laspina Williams v Laspina Williams 742 
A2d 840 (1999) the co-mother quit her job when the child was a baby to provide full-time care but the judgment 
contains no reference to primary caregiver. 
66 It is also notable that primary caregiver concerns have never been used as the basis for granting residence to 
the co-mother. 
67  See eg JAL where the court held that the fact that birth mother was the primary caregiver did not diminish 
child’s bond with the co-mother: JAL v EPH 682 A2d 1314 (1996) and KGT v PD [2005] BCJ No 2935 in 
which the court refers numerous times to ‘heavier load’ of care borne by the birth mother and calls her the 
primary caregiver, but qualifies this by adding ‘That is not, in itself, unusual; it is usual for one parent to take a 
greater role in the parenting duties. That does not mean the other is any less a parent’: at para 35. 
68 See eg claims by the birth mother of undertaking ‘ninety percent’ and ‘99%’ of the parenting, respectively, in 
Re Cheyenne Jones Ohio App LEXIS 2296 (2002) and Valore v Bronicki Pa Dist & Cnty Dec LEXIS 433 
(2005). 
69 See Buist v Greaves [1997] OJ No 2646: ‘There is no doubt that the relationship between Simon and Ms Buist 
is very close; however, Simon does not consider her his mother. Ms Greaves is his mother. He calls her 
‘mamma’ while he calls Ms Buist ‘gaga’ which is short for Peggy’: at 34. 
70 Note a recent exception, ‘AB has grown up knowing Dawn as her mother in the same manner that she knows 
Stephanie as her mother’ In re Parentage of AB 818 NE2d 126 (2004) at 132. 
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a parent or co-parent (such terms also, although decreasingly, appear within 
disclaiming quotation marks.)71 A claim to being a mother by the co-mother is seen 
not as complementing the relationship of the birth mother and child, but as 
competing with it (hence quantity of caregiving is relevant) or as attempting to usurp 
it altogether.72  This point connects to the ways in which gendered expectations of 
parenting are mapped onto parents’ and judges’ understanding of the importance of 








While the above section has explored some of the ways in which functional family 
arguments have been misused by birth mothers, this section examines ways in which 
biology  is  centred  or  essentialised  such  that  claims  to  functional  family  by  co- 
mothers are marginalised or entirely silenced. Julie Shapiro reminds us that defying 
‘the primacy of the biological link as the defining factor in parenthood’ is a necessary 
 
prerequisite  for  lesbian  family  formation,73    yet  in  the  intra-lesbian  cases  we 
frequently see biology raised to a rarefied level as birth mothers claim that the co- 
mother is a ‘biological stranger’ to the child.74 
 
To begin with what perhaps seems a small point, I can’t recall reading a single 




71 That the appearance of quotation marks is about a lot more than grammar is demonstrated in numerous cases. 
For example in the first instance decision in Alison D, the dissenting judge who would have granted co-mother 
standing places quote marks around ‘biological stranger’, while the majority, and majority on appeal, does not 
do so: Alison D v Virginia M (1990) 155 AD2d 11; Alison D v Virginia M 77 NY2d 651 (1991).  See also the 
use of the parent with and without quote marks in White v Thompson (1999) 11 SW3d 913. A notable contrast is 
MDR, one of the most openly affirming judgments of lesbian families, which never puts quote marks around the 
terms mother or parent: MDR v Ontario (Deputy Registrar General) [2006] OJ No 2268. 
72 See eg expert evidence in SF v MD where the child called both women ‘mother’ led to a ‘risk of confounding 
the roles when they are both contenders for the same role’: SF v MD 751 A2d 9 (2000) at 18, emphasis added. 
See also the evidence of the birth mother in JAL that she cut contact between the child and co-mother ‘because 
she felt that JAL was trying to establish a parental relationship and to undermine EPH as a parent’ JAL v EPH 
682 A2d 1314 (1996) at 1318. See also birth mother’s claim that co-mother seeing herself as a mother was 
‘manipulating and confusing’ the child: In Re Cheyenne Jones Ohio App LEXIS 2296 (2002) at para 9. 
73 Julie Shapiro, above note 18 at 598-599. 
74  Alison D, despite being called ‘mommy’ by the child, was characterised by the New York Court of Appeal 
majority as ‘a biological stranger to the child’ Alison D v Virginia M 77 NY2d 651 (1991) at 655. The ‘stranger’ 
characterisation, was extended into a ‘stranger danger’ analogy by the birth mother in Miller-Jenkins when she 
claimed in the press that contact between the child and co-mother ‘would be like somebody off the streets 
coming and taking my daughter…They have no ties to my daughter’: New York Times, 8 September 2005. 
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breast-fed the children as babies. Yet this is a constant refrain in the intra-lesbian 
cases: strike one for biology.75 
 
 
The triumph of biology is probably best demonstrated by the simple observation that 
in 65 cases reviewed for this analysis (comprising 76 available judgments), primary 
residence was awarded to the co-mother at any level of the claim only twice.76 In both 
cases this only occurred after the birth mother acted in contempt of court, through 
preventing earlier court-ordered contact and evincing a determined plan to sever the 
relationship with the co-mother through a variety of means including relocation.77 
The decision to change residence was therefore based in both cases on the ground 
that it was the only option available to preserve a relationship with both parents. In 
one of these two cases, Re G (No 2), the decision was nonetheless reversed by the 
House of Lords in a judgment that emphatically propounds the continuing 
importance of biology in motherhood.78 
 
 
The contrast between the Court of Appeal and House of Lords decisions in Re G (No 
 
2) is stark. At Court of Appeal a host of legal authorities was presented by the birth 
mother on the preference for biological parents when there is ‘some other contender 
for care’ who is a ‘non-parent’.79 Yet Thorpe LJ refused to ‘extend’ any general 
principle from those authorities on the basis that the case at hand was simply not 
about a non-parent: 
The question is: who is a natural parent? In the [case law] all the judges spoke 
of the biological parent as the natural parent, but in the eyes of the child the 
natural parent may be a non-biological parent who, by virtue of long settled 
care, has become the child’s psychological parent. That consideration is 
obviously pertinent to any resolution of the competing claims of same sex 
parents. As in the present case the family may be created by mutual agreement 





75 See eg  Re G (No 2) [2006] 4 All ER 241 at para 9 (a fact not mentioned in either of the two Court of Appeal 
judgments in the case); KGT v PD [2005] BCJ No 2935 at para 11 and 30; AH v MP 857 NE2d 1061 (2006) at 
1067. 
76 In one case one of the four children lived with the co-mother, but this was at the request of the birth mother. 
The co-mother failed to gain custody of the other three children due to the court’s preference for a biological 
parent: Jacob v Shultz-Jacob WL 1240885 (Pa Super) (2007). 
77 See Jones v Boring Jones 884 A2d 915 (2005), applying a child’s best interests test ‘weighted in favour of the 
biological parent’ at para 12. See paras  14-15 on the birth mother’s ‘sabotage’ of the co-mother’s relationship 
with the children. 
78 Re G (No 2) [2006] EWCA Civ 372; Re G [2006] 4 All ER 241. 
79 Re G (No 2) [2006] EWCA Civ 372 at para 39 
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developing baby, is broadly shared the children will not distinguish between one 
woman and the other on the grounds of biological relationship.80 
 
 
Thorpe LJ made two other key points rejecting the primacy of biology. Firstly he 
noted other kinds of lesbian and gay family forms, such as gay male couples having a 
child through surrogacy, or lesbian couples in which one mother was genetic and the 
other the birth mother in order to highlight the arbitrariness of considering a 
biological link in such families.81 Secondly, Thorpe LJ argued that no distinction 
between a biological and non-biological parent would be made by the court in a 
family law case concerning a heterosexual family formed with the use of donated 
gametes.82  This is a very simple but absolutely fundamental point; which is 
completely missed by Baroness Hale’s majority judgment in the Lords which she 
commences by stating that the issues and legal principles in the case are ‘just the 
same’ as those that arise in heterosexual couples.83 Quite apart from the fact that 
heterosexual couples are generally able to have children genetically connected to 
both parties, in cases when they must use donor gametes heterosexual couples do 
obtain both legal and social status in relation to unrelated children. Beyond the legal 
recognition of heterosexual non-genetic parents, a heterosexual non-biological father 
is seen as separate from the genetic mother; his role is viewed as unique and 
irreplaceable even if non-genetic because it is gendered. A heterosexual non- 
biological mother using donated eggs is still the gestational mother, again a unique 
and irreplaceable connection. The co-mother in a lesbian family by contrast is viewed 




The Lords judgment in Re G (No 2) established a clear ‘parent versus non-parent’ 
standard for intra-lesbian family disputes. While all of the Lords concurred with the 
judgment  of  Baroness  Hale,  Lord  Nicholls  and  Scott  each  added  an  emphatic 





80 Re G (No 2) [2006] EWCA Civ 372 at para 44. 
81 Re G (No 2) [2006] EWCA Civ 372 at para 42. 
82 The example he gives is of donated eggs: Re G (No 2) [2006] EWCA Civ 372 at para 41. 
83  Re G [2006] 4 All ER 241 at para 6. Alison Diduck critiques Baroness Hale’s judgment on the grounds of 
misplaced universalism and argues there is an increasing assumption that biology is welfare in the application of 
the best interests principle: ‘“If Only We Can Find the Appropriate Terms to use the Issue Will be Solved”: 
Law, Identity and Parenthood’ (19) Child and Family Law Quarterly 458. 
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I wish to emphasise one point. In this case the dispute is not between two 
biological parents…In reaching its decision the court should always have in 
mind that in the ordinary way the rearing of a child by his or her biological 
parent can be expected to be in the child’s best interests, both in the short term 
and also, and importantly, in the longer term. I decry any tendency to diminish 
the significance of this factor. A child should not be removed from the primary 
care of his or her biological parent without compelling reason.84 
 
 
and   
Thorpe   LJ   failed   to   give   the   gestational,   biological   and   psychological 
relationship between [the birth mother] and the girls the weight that the 




Baroness Hale did acknowledge Thorpe LJ’s argument about the diversity of 
parenting practices by noting that a ‘natural parent’ may indeed be a genetic, 
gestational or social and psychological parent. This didn’t help the co-mother, 
however, because Baroness Hale found that the birth mother ‘is the natural mother 
of these children in every sense of that term’.86 While the co-mother, like an adoptive 
parent, is a psychological parent,87 the birth mother is ‘both their biological and their 
psychological parent’.88  The birth mother has all of the dimensions of parenthood, 
while the co-mother only has one aspect– hence the birth mother, when in contest, 
will always be more of a parent.89 
 
 
(iii) Biology and father absence collide 
 
84 Re G [2006] 4 All ER 241per Lord Nicholls at para 2. 
85 Re G [2006] 4 All ER 241 at para 3 (emphasis added). The weight of biology may be lessened where it is not 
the  mother’s  biological  connectedness  being  asserted.  See  for  example  the  case  of  a  co-mother  versus 
grandparent dispute over custody of the child where the birth mother had died, in which a concurring judge 
stated, ‘we should never say that mere blood relations should trump a relationship based on love and trust’: 
Clifford K and Tina B v Paul S 619 SE2d 138 (2005) at 163. Although note Maynard J in dissent in the same 
case began, ‘I am dismayed that this Court has written an opinion that is so anti-family. The majority’s decision 
in this case places a child in a single-parent home with a person who is not a biological relative even though a 
two-parent home consisting of the child’s biological relatives – his grandparents – is available. I am simply at a 
loss to understand the majority’s reasoning…’ at 164. 
86 Re G [2006] 4 All ER 241 at para 44 (emphasis added). 
87 The use of the expression ‘quasi parent’ in a number of the UK cases also betrays a sense that being a social 
parent is only even performing a small portion of parenthood, indeed literally a quarter, it is not being a whole 
parent. See eg also the co-mother who had been the child’s primary caregiver for the first two years described as 
a ‘quasi’ parent in G v F [1998] 3 FCR 1. See also the adoption case: Re M [2004] NIFam 3. 
88 Re G [2006] 4 All ER 241 at para 37, emphasis added. 
89 This was explicitly stated as a principle in VC v MJB, 748 A2d 539 (2000) which held that a psychological 
parent stands in parity with legal parent but then continued, ‘The legal parent’s status is a significant weight in 
the best interests balance because eventually, in the search for self-knowledge, the child’s interest in his or her 
roots will emerge. Thus, under ordinary circumstances when the evidence concerning the child’s best interests 
(as between a legal parent and a psychological parent) is in equipoise, custody will be awarded to the legal 
parent’: at 554. 
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Many of the intra-lesbian cases involve children conceived with the use of an 
anonymous donor. Yet in instances where the donor is a known man, it is remarkable 
how frequently the birth mother, not content to assert her own biological supremacy, 
also claims it for the sperm donor in asserting that he, rather than the co-mother, is 
(now) the child’s other parent. These cases include instances where the donor has no 
financial responsibility for the child, has had no contact with the child,90 and where 
the express agreement with the donor was that the mothers would be the sole parents 
of the child. Birth mothers have gone so far as to marry gay donors,91 amend birth 
certificates to list donors as parents, and seek court declarations of paternity in order 
to defeat co-mothers’ claims for contact with children.92 As with other challenges to 
the legal recognition of lesbian families made by lesbian mothers, the retrograde 




Cases in which co-mother are opposed by birth both biological parents bring biology 
glaringly to the forefront. In one such case, H and J,94 the birth mother denied that 
the  co-mother  was  either  a  legal  parent  or  a  psychological  parent  under  the 
Australian Family  Law  Act.95  While the co-mother referred to herself as the ‘non- 
biological  co-parent’,  the  Court  noted  that  she  ‘provided  no  genetic  material, 
personal to her, to assist in the conception’ and so decided that for the sake of 
‘neutrality’ it would refer to her as ‘the applicant’.96 In contrast, the birth mother and 
 








90 See eg H and J [2006] FMCA fam 514. 
91  See also BL v Ba (Li) [2006] ACWSJ LEXIS 4967; in Matter of Parentage  of LB 89 P3d (2004) the birth 
mother responded to the co-mother’s application for parentage by changing the child’s birth certificate and 
school records to add the donor as father and even went so far as to marry him in order to assert paternity: at 
275. 
92 See eg White v Thompson 11 SW3d 913 (1999). 
93 There are many contenders for the most homophobic argument in the intra-lesbian cases, but for my money 
the award goes to AL v YR, WL 393521 (Mo Cir) (1996) where the birth mother argues that the co-mother, her 
former lesbian partner, is not an ‘appropriate caretaker for the minor child because she is a lesbian’ at para 18. 
94 H and J [2006] FMCA fam 514. 
95  The co-mother’s claim to be a legal parent was based on the automatic ascription of status under Northern 
Territory law, in a provision not picked up by prescription in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60H; her claim to 
be a psychological parent was based on Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 65C. 
96 H and J [2006] FMCA fam 514 para 5. 
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the judgment. 97 The prevalence of biology in this choice of terminology is 
underscored by the fact that the donor was not legally a father,98 and the absence of 
‘genetic material’ or a genetic or biological ‘connection’ between the co-mother and 
child -  an uncontested matter - was referred to seven times. 
 
 
The co-mother was held in H and J not to be a legal parent. In deciding whether she 
could be a psychological parent (under the broad person ‘concerned with the care, 
welfare  and  development’ category)  the  Magistrate held  that  while  an  unknown 
father or sperm donor would automatically qualify, the co-mother would have to 
bring evidence to prove the child was, and remained, attached to her.99 
Obviously, a biological parent can be significant to a child, in the sense of being 
important to that child, notwithstanding he or she has no involvement at all in 
the care of that particular child. In that case, the importance arises as a result of 
the particular child having a shared genetic inheritance with the parent. The 
applicant in this case cannot claim such a genetic significance to [the child]. In 
my view, her claim to be of significance to [the child] can only be based on 
[what has been described] as past performance.100 
 
 
This passage is fascinating in that a genetic relationship, even one with no social 
dimension and no legal status, is understood to be of both present and future 
relevance, while a functional parent is framed as someone only from the past. Being a 
parent endures, doing parenting ceases. This decision is all the more striking because 
it takes place in one of the few jurisdictions, Australia, which has always recognised 
psychological parents.101 
 
H and J highlights how little biological fathers need to do to be seen as enduring and 
significant figures in children’s lives. This is borne out in the donor versus mother 
 
97  H and J [2006] FMCA fam 514, ‘as there is no controversy regarding their biological connection with [the 
child], in the sense they provided respectively the ovum and sperm, which resulted in [her] conception’: at para 
6. 
98  See Jenni Millbank, ‘Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Families in Australian Law - Part Two: Children’ 
(2006) 34 Federal Law Review 205. 
99 The Court determined only that the co-mother had the potential to satisfy 65C: H and J [2006] FMCA fam 
514 at para 76. 
100 H and J [2006] FMCA fam 514 at para 61. 
101 The original Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 64(1) permitted the Family Court of Australia to grant custody to 
‘a person other than a party to the marriage’ if it was ‘satisfied that it is desirable to do so’. Until 1987 the 
jurisdiction of the court was by reference to marriage due to constitutional limitations, but in 1987 it was 
extended to all children through a reference of powers from the states. Reforms in 1987 introduced section 63C 
which provided in subsection (c) that proceedings could be instituted by ‘any other person who has an interest in 
the welfare of the child’. In 1995 that section was replaced with the current section 65C which provides orders 
may be sought and made in favour of ‘any person concerned with the care, welfare and development’ of the 
child. 
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cases where a valorised biological status in combination with the social expectation 
that parenting for men simply requires doing much less caring work than women,102 
and that men’s gendered parenting is necessary for children’s development 
(particularly for boys) has meant that donors are received by courts as if they are in 
fact the other parent. A functional family model should protect the autonomy of the 
mothers in these circumstances, because it is they who are the functioning family 
unit. But while the co-mother has to meet a very high standard to prove herself a 
functional parent, the donor through friendly or recreational contact relationship 
with the child, or even the sincere wish to have such relationship which has not in 
fact occurred to date,103 is seen as a real and immutable father. 
 
 
Mothers’ claims to functional family in such circumstances are rarely acknowledged 
as valid descriptions of their (and their child’s) experience, much less accepted by 
courts as the basis for denying parental status to men or preventing a ‘normal father- 
child’ contact relationship. This clash of ideas regarding lived versus biological family 
was manifest in the first instance (and appellate dissent) versus appellate majority 
judgments in the much discussed New York case of Thomas S v Robin Y.104 The case 
involved a child who was nine years old by the time of hearing. The biological father 
had six years of friendly holiday contact with the child, her sister (not his biological 
child) and the mothers, but a dispute erupted when he sought contact with the child 
alone in order to introduce the child to his family (whom he thought would not be 
comfortable with her two mothers). In order to pursue contact, Thomas claimed full 
parental status; an action which the mothers felt profoundly threatened their family 
structure. Part of the difficulty of that case was the all or nothing claim to parental 
status, which led to a highly polarised debate in gay and lesbian legal scholarship.105 
A functional family analysis was applied at first instance to deny paternity (and 
therefore, under New York law on standing, contact), but this was overturned on 
appeal.  Fred  Bernstein  has  argued,  compellingly  in  my  view,  that  a  proper 
 
 
102 See eg Smart and Neale above note 4 at 47-48; Diduck above note 4 at 85-98. Julie Shapiro draws attention 
to the different meanings inherent in the verbs ‘to mother’ and ‘to father’ a child: above note 18 at 598. 
103  Carol Smart notes this in the context of family law more generally: ‘Care talk is…often based on a rights 
claim: that is to say, many fathers are claiming a right to start caring or to care in the future. But the assertion of 
the desire to become a responsible, caring parent is treated as a natural urge that springs from instinctual love; it 
is therefore almost unassailable’: Carol Smart, ‘The Ethic of Justice Strikes Back: Changing Narratives of 
Fatherhood’ in  Alison Diduck and Katherine O’Donovan (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (2006). 
104 Thomas S v Robin Y 618 NYS2d 356 (1994); 599 NYS2d 377 (1995). 
105  See Katherine Arnup and Susan Boyd, ‘Familial Disputes? Sperm Donors, Lesbian Mothers, and Legal 
Parenthood’ in Herman and Stychin above note 6. 
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application of functional family in such a situation would have protected the lesbian- 
led  family  by  denying  paternity,  but  could  also  act  to  maintain  an  established 
contact-relationship if it was beneficial to the child (although it would not expand or 
alter the relationship as Thomas S had sought to do).106 
 
 
By contrast to the situation in Thomas S, which could have been (but was not) 
resolved by reference to the pre-existing pattern of relationships which incorporated 
a functional family approach, many of the more recent disputes between known 
donors/biological fathers and lesbian mothers involve toddlers or babies, with 
litigation commenced in some cases only weeks after the child’s birth.107  In these 
cases there is no pre-existing pattern of contact with the donors whose claim rests 
solely on their biological connection. A striking example is the New Zealand dispute, 
P v K and M, in which there are (so far) six judgments.108 M and K, a lesbian couple 
approached a gay male couple, P and F, to form a family. Unlike many other lesbian 
and gay families which are based on loose oral arrangements, the parties here 
executed a written agreement which stated that the mothers would be the primary 
parents and caregivers, while the biological father and his partner would be ‘God 
parents’. The men were to have no less than 14 days of contact per year, they would 
be consulted about major decisions concerning the child’s upbringing, although the 
mothers would have the final say, and guardianship would only pass to the men in 
the event that both women died or were incapacitated.109 The mothers characterised 
this  as  an  avuncular  role,  while  the  men  saw  the  biological  father’s  role  as  an 
‘interested, active and committed parent’110: a father in the ‘traditional sense of the 
 
word’.111  Although no aspect of the agreement envisaged that the men would have 
prime or shared decision-making about the child, or responsibility over the child, 
this agreement was regarded by the court as being similar to the meaning of legal 
guardianship  for  the  biological  father.112   (It  is  also  notable  that  although  the 
 
 
106  See Fred Bernstein, ‘This Child Does have Two Mothers…And a Sperm Donor with Visitation’ (1996) 22 
New York University Review of Law and Social Change 1. 
107 See also Re Patrick (2002) FLC 93-096; X v Y (2002) SLT (Sh Ct) 161. In H and J & D [2006] FamCA 1398 
it is unclear exactly when litigation commenced but by the time of judgment the child was just over one year 
old. 
108 K v M (2002) 22 FRNZ 360; P v K & M (Family Court, Auckland, Unreported, Doogue J, 8 August 2002); P 
v K [2003] 2 NZLR 787; P v K & M [2004] NZFLR 752; P v K [2004] 2 NZLR 421; P v K [2006] NZFLR 22. 
109 See P v K [2003] 2 NZLR 787 at para 11. 
110 P v K & M [2004] NZFLR 752 at para 36. 
111 P v K [2006] NZFLR 22 at para 30. 
112 P v K & M [2004] NZFLR 752 at para 33. 
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agreement treated the biological father and his male partner identically in almost all 
aspects, the position of the partner is entirely overlooked in all of the judgments: 
strike two for biology). 
 
 
When the biological father applied for standing to seek parental responsibility and 
contact, the Court characterised legislation that severs the parental status of gamete 
donors as ‘distorting’ the child’s ‘family relationships’.113  The child’s right to know 
and be cared for by his parents under domestic and international law was interpreted 
at all levels unhesitatingly by reference to his biological parents, not to his functional 
parents.114 While New Zealand law according parental status to a mother’s male 
partner in the situation of donor conception was justifiable, according to the court, 
for ‘plausible policy reasons’ of ‘protecting the security of the traditional nuclear 
family’, the mothers’ family form was not entitled to such protection.115 This clearly 
bears out Katherine O’Donovan’s argument that: 
genetic relationships are the least important when the structural and ideological 
features are not contentious. In other words, when the resulting family ‘looks 
right’ … the genetic links are not an issue and can be ignored. It is only when the 
structural  or ideological features of the resulting family raise concern – for 
example in the case of lesbian parents – that the genetic relationships become 




When the child was two years old the biological father was made a guardian of the 
child, according him parental responsibility, (as was the co-mother)117, and granted 
the monthly contact he sought.118 The court held that the mothers’ male friends and 
role models ‘could never be a substitute for a boy’s right to a special and formalised 




113 P v K [2003] 2 NZLR 787 at para 139. 
114 P v K [2003] 2 NZLR 787 at paras 73-74, 137, 143; P v K & M [2004] NZFLR 752 at para 45; P v K [2004] 
2 NZLR 421 approvingly refers to counsel’s argument that this right is ‘not merely to see a biological parent 
from time to time but to be parented by them in the fullest possible sense’ at para 39 and continues in para 40; P 
v K [2006] NZFLR 22 at paras 49-50, 97. 
115  P v K [2003] 2 NZLR 787 at para 19. Note that this status has since been extended to a mother’s female 
partner through legislative reforms: Status of Children Act 1969 (NZ) s 18. 
116 Katherine O’Donovan, ‘Genetics, Fathers and Families: Exploring the Implications of Changing the Law in 
Favour of Identifying Sperm Donors’ (2006) 15 Social and Legal Studies 494. 
117 Although note that the co-mother’s application for legal status was characterised both by the biological father 
and the court as an attack upon him rather than a necessary incident of her full-time parental role:  P v K [2003] 
2 NZLR 787, ‘The first shot was fired by the mother’s partner’ (referring to her application for guardianship) at 
20. 
118 P v K & M [2004] NZFLR 752; P v K [2004] 2 NZLR 421 appeal upheld. 
119 P v K [2004] 2 NZLR 421 at para 41. 
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In 2005 the biological father sought overnight contact with the child, which would 
encompass three days every other weekend prior to the child starting school and 
include half of school holidays thereafter; a ‘typical’ separated father contact regime, 
which was granted over the continued objection of the mothers. Disturbingly, the 
2005 judgment repeatedly refers to the ‘father and son’ relationship, holds that it is 
 
irrelevant  that  the  biological  parents  never  lived  together  as  a  family  unit,120 
expressly applies child psychology literature on the benefits of contact with fathers in 
separated heterosexual families in deciding that overnight contact is in the child’s 
best interests,121 and determines that the relationship: 
‘should be regarded no differently from any other father/son relationship…the 
circumstances surrounding  [the child’s] birth and his subsequent upbringing 
are irrelevant.122 
 
The mothers’ view that there is a vital difference in their family between a ‘biological 








120 P v K [2006]  NZFLR 22 at para 31. The mothers’ attempt to distinguish between a biological father and a 
parent was met with an assertion by the court that it, not they, understands the child’s ‘reality’ of his experience 
of his relationship with his ‘daddy’, which it is authorised to create and maintain: paras 26-27, 63-66, 136. 
121 P v K [2006] NZFLR 22 at para 102, 109-110. 
122P v K [2006]  NZFLR 22 at para 67. In earlier decisions the mothers were repeatedly chastised for arguing 
that the biological father had no legal status as a father: see eg P v K [2003] 2 NZLR 787 at para 18 the ‘mother 
and her partner have not hesitated to invoke procedural obstacles…The points they raised…would quite simply 
not  have  been  available to  them had  the  child  been  conceived as  a  result  of  heterosexual contact  or  a 
heterosexual relationship’ (see also para 94). The method of conception is viewed as a mere sexual and legal 
technicality, not as signifying a completely different kind of family. The Court however never asks the question 
whether it would have granted parental responsibility and contact to a biological father if it was the primary 
parents who were in a heterosexual relationship with each other, rather than (as implicitly imagined here) with 
the biological father. 
123 The following cross examination of the birth mother took place: 
 
‘COUNSEL: You don't actually see [P] as a parent do you? 
M: We don't see him as a primary parent no. 
COUNSEL: But do you see him as a parent? 
M: I see him as a biological father. 
COUNSEL: And that's a problem isn't it. That he sees himself as a parent and you see him as a 
biological father? 
M: Yeah. Absolutely. And our original intention was never that he be a primary parent and that's - to us 
- I think there's - if you're making a distinction as a secondary parent then that's fine but when you say 
parent everybody's seeing him as a primary parent. There's no distinction made. [K] and I are [D's] 
parents and we have always been [D's] parents. If you ask [D] who his parents are he'll say [K] and I. 
We are his primary attachment figures. We are the people that he comes to. We are his focus.’ 
P v K [2006] NZFLR 22 at para 26. 
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parenting.124 Yet this perspective has been met with frank bewilderment or outright 
disdain by judges in donor versus mother disputes.125 
 
 
Functional family is invisible in court in this context; because it is same-gendered 
parenting, the addition of a male parent is not seen to take away  anything from the 
family (for example by intruding on their autonomy or invalidating their family 
form),126  it only adds to it.   The mothers are viewed as inexplicably trying to deny 
their child something good, something special and something that their family lacks: 
a daddy.127 The mothers’ behaviour in resisting a third parent in their family is 
therefore selfish, non-child centred and weird;128 while the donor/father’s behaviour 
in trying to join or control that family is natural, understandable, and loving.129 
 
 
Not all recent donor verus mother cases have been as openly or wholly invalidating of 
the mothers’ perspectives on their family form as the P v K cases, but even judgments 
that do accept the mother-led family as the core family unit have generally failed to 
see anything wrong in ‘adding’ to it.130  The mothers, we hear time and time again, 
will just have to accommodate their child’s ‘need’ for a father.131  Lesbian mothers 
may be functional family but they are not a complete family. 
 
 




My conclusion is that the functional family standard is onerous, and moreover is 
frequently misused or marginalised in intra-lesbian disputes. Additionally I contend 
that in donor v mother disputes functional family analysis is entirely sidestepped by 
a focus on biology and the judicial expectation of gendered parenting. Because of 
 
 
124 See Catherine Donovan, ‘Who Needs a Father? Negotiating Biological Fatherhood in British Families Using 
Self-Insemination’ (2000) 3 Sexualities 149. 
125  When mothers have not wanted the man to use the word ‘Dad’ to name his own role, they have been 
characterised as ‘obsessed’ and ‘irrational’: see Re Patrick (2002) FLC 93-096 at para 270. 
126 In the words of the judge in one Australian case, ‘The fact that the applicants see the father as an intrusion in 
their family life is a matter for them. The reality is, he is not’: Re Patrick (2002) FLC 93-096 para 163. 
127 See eg P v K [2003] 2 NZLR 787 at 53; P v K [2006] NZFLR 22 at 136. 
128 In X v Y (2002) SLT (Sh Ct) 161 the mothers’ view of themselves as a complete family is characterised by 
the Glasgow Sherrif’s Court as ‘narrow and somewhat claustrophobic’ and extremely ‘possessive and selfish’. 
129  Re Patrick (2002) FLC 93-096 ‘a natural, ordinary, parental and fatherly manner’ (at para 270), ‘anxious, 
willing and able to play a fatherly role in a traditional sense’ (at para 272). 
130 For a relatively thoughtful judgment which explores and validates much of the mothers’ experiences, yet still 
makes orders in favour of the biological father that are very much tailored to satisfying his emotional needs: see 
Re D [2006] EWHC 2. 
131 See Re Patrick (2002) FLC 93-096; Re D [2006] EWHC 2. 
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these limitations I make an argument for a form of automatic, universal and stable 
legal recognition for co-mothers based on pre-conception intention. The rationale for 
recognition is that the attempt to conceive was a shared enterprise between the 
women. This shared enterprise is not assessed by reference to post-birth factors, 
such as caregiving in the functional family model posed by American scholars such as 
Paula Ettelbrick and Nancy Polikoff.132 Nor does it require ‘holding out’ the child as 
one’s own after birth, which is an element of a recent Supreme Court of California 
case, Elisa B,133 which accords parental recognition to lesbian co-mothers.134 This 
proposal centres the intention to form a family in the pre-birth context, marked by 
consent to the conception attempt taking place within the women’s relationship. 
 
 
Intention, never mind shared intention, is one of the grand vexed questions of law: 
one which is intensely exacerbated by informal agreements in the domestic realm. 
There are several additional factors which complicate the issue of agreement in the 
realm of gay and lesbian parenting in particular. One is that discussions take place 
against a backdrop of legal invalidation, so very often there simply is no framework 
to structure expectations or understandings of parties’ roles, or to equalise unequal 
power relations between biological and non-biological parents.   (Moreover, even if 
legal recognition avenues exist, they may be unknown to the parties, poorly 
understood or distrusted.) The case law suggests that lesbian mothers are far more 
likely in pre-conception planning to define a known donor’s role than to address the 
co-mother’s role (possibly because they assume that the donor has some existing 






132  Paula Ettelbrick’s formulation includes the final consideration ‘Has the woman seeking recognition abided 
by that agreement [of both women to be co-equal parents] by living with the child and actually provided care to 
the child on a daily basis’: Paula Ettelbrick, ‘Who is a Parent? The Need to Develop a Lesbian Conscious 
Family Law’ (1993) 10 New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 513 at 548. 
133 The Court refined the presumed parentage test as follows: 
 
Emily is a presumed mother of the twins…because she received the children into her home and openly 
held them out as her natural children …[and] she actively participated in causing the children to be 
conceived with the understanding that she would raise the children together with the birth mother she 
voluntarily accepted the rights and obligations of parenthood after the children were born, and there are 
no competing claims to her being the children’s second parent. 
Elisa B v Superior Court of El Dorado County, 37 Cal 4th 108 at 125(2005). 
134 Elisa B v Superior Court of El Dorado County, 37 Cal 4th 108 (2005). This result was also achieved by an 
intact lesbian family which successfully argued for a gender-neutral interpretation of the statutory presumption 
of parenthood in the New Jersey Superior Court: In the Matter of the Parentage of the Child Kimberly Robinson 
890 A2d 1036 (2005). 
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Agreements about donors or biological fathers’ roles are also fraught. It is not 
uncommon for such agreements to be premised upon misunderstanding of the 
existing  legal  status  of  donors, or  misunderstandings as  to  the  enforceability of 
formal  agreements.  Many,  if  not  most,  arrangements  proceed  on  the  basis  of 
informal agreements. Even if  formalised, a  written  agreement may not  help  the 
parties to see in advance that they understand their respective roles in profoundly 
different ways (as P v K, above, illustrates). The case law on donor versus mother 
disputes strongly suggests that parties may appear to agree, while they in fact mean 
very different things by what they say, even when using the same words. As the court 
noted  in  the  English  case  of  Re  D,  where  the  parties  had  agreed  upon  donor 
‘involvement’, this term had totally different meanings: 
 
However behind their apparently similar objectives, they were actually hoping 
for different things. Mr B was expecting something of the role of the absent 
parent after divorce who might share the child’s leisure time equally with the 
child’s mother and participate in decisions about the child whereas Ms A and 
Ms C intended that he should complement their primary care of the child by 
being a real father but by doing so through no more than relatively infrequent 
visits [every three or four weeks] and benign and loving interest.135 
 
 
Erica Haimes and Kate Weiner highlight another example in a discussion in which a 
potential donor indicated that he would like ‘minimal involvement’ of ‘about five per 
cent’ with the mother to have ‘95 per cent’ of the parenting role. The mother 
continued: 
he said this thing about 95 per cent and explained what it meant to him, so he 
then said, ‘I wouldn’t feel happy…if you sent the child to a school that I didn’t 
approve of’. And that was the point at which it kind of scared me, because I felt 
like whatever 95 per cent is, that’s well within it to me.136 
 
 
Even when intention is clearly expressed, mutually understood and evidenced, it has 
not been given equal attention or weight in disputes. There is a marked focus in the 
intra-lesbian case law upon the birth mother’s intentions as to her partner’s role, 
rather than their mutual intentions. In the donor verus mother cases there is a 
similar preference for the donor’s desires for his own role, with little attention to the 
birth  mother’s  intentions  as  to  family  form  and  none  at  all  to  the  co-mother’s 
 
135Re D [2006] EWHC 2 at para 5. See also Deborah Dempsey’s discussion of the mother and biological father’s 
completely unrelated understanding of donation, fatherhood and kinship in the Australian case of Re Patrick: 
Dempsey,  ‘Donor,  Father  or  Parent?  Conceiving  Paternity  in  the  Australian  Family  Court’  (2004)  18 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 76. 
136 Erica Haimes and Kate Weiner, ‘“Everybody’s got a dad…”. Issues for Lesbian Families in the Management 
of Donor Insemination’ (2000) 22 Sociology of Health and Illness 477 at 486. 
27  
intentions.137 In more than one case the court has used a ‘but for’ test of the biological 
father’s intention, asking: would he have agreed to donate if he thought that his role 
would be limited to being a sperm donor or that he would not be able to be a 
‘traditional’ father?138 No such ‘but for’ intention has applied to the mothers, with no 
 
court to date considering the question: would the mothers have agreed to conceiving 
with that particular donor if they thought he would be a ‘traditional father’ with 
parental responsibility over, and every-other weekend contact with, their child? As 
Susan Boyd has noted in her recent analysis of Canadian family law cases concerning 
children born through assisted reproduction: 
Intentionality concerning family form and who should be named on the birth 
certificate seems to carry increasing importance – but not just any kind of 
intentionality. The privileged form of intentionality is that which is formed 
before the birth, either by an existing, acknowledged genetic parent, or, 
increasingly, by a genetic father after birth.139 
 
 
Thus, a shift from biology to intention may be unhelpful if it is simply a shift of focus 
to the privileged intention of one of the biological parents (and moreover an inquiry 
that remains premised on essentialised and gendered understandings of how those 
intentions will be performed.) 
 
 
Finally, I acknowledge that roles may alter or evolve in a positive and consensual 
manner after conception in a way not anticipated by the agreement. If disputes arise 
years later, it would be antithetical to a functional family approach to formalistically 
hold people to an earlier agreement that does not accord with their lived experience 








137 See also Susan Boyd’s observations on Canadian cases, some of which concern single mother and 
heterosexual family forms that, ‘The father’s intentionality in combination with his bio-genetic tie wins out over 
the birth mother’s bio-genetic tie and contrary intention’ and there is a clear trend of ‘over-emphasizing the 
(male) genetic tie’ at the expense of maternal autonomy, above note 5. 
138 P v K [2003] 2 NZLR 787; Re Patrick (2002) FLC 93-096 at 275; X v Y (2002) SLT (Sh Ct) 161. 
139 Boyd above note 5. 
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For all of these reasons, and more,140 privatised binding pre-conception contracts 
placing the burden of consciously negotiating individual agreements onto each and 
every lesbian-led family should not be contemplated.141 This is not what I mean by an 
intention centred model. Rather, legal presumptions of parental status embodying 
the likely intentions of most parents in lesbian-led families should apply 
automatically. It is important to note that in the vast majority of lesbian-led families 
these intentions as to the family form are followed through by actual family function 
after birth, so intention and functionality are linked elements of a continuum rather 
than dichotomous modes of recognition.142 Automatic parental status presumptions 
cannot cover all situations, and thus must be tempered with some discretionary 
powers as well as the ability to opt-in to additional recognition mechanisms for those 
family forms which fall outside the sweep of presumptions. 
 
 
The model is based on two ‘bright line’ presumptions: 
 
1.  If two women are in a committed cohabiting relationship (whether or not 
formalised) and the non-birth mother consents to her partner’s attempt to 
conceive through assisted conception, she is the second parent of the resulting 








140 Including, for example, that an exclusive focus on binding agreements could actually preclude a child’s best 
interests consideration (as standing restrictions have done in many US states). Also it is possible that such an 
approach could be uncritically transferred across to the surrogacy context, failing to acknowledge key issues 
such as power imbalances and the experience of the gestational mother when the agreement is to sever rather 
than share the parental relationship. Such parallels are often drawn in the US as judicial analysis of parenting by 
intention first developed in surrogacy cases (see eg the National Center for Lesbian Rights Model Brief which 
extensively draws on and seeks to extend principles from surrogacy law: Shannon Minter and Kate Kendall, 
‘Beyond Second-Parent Adoption: The Uniform Parentage Act and the “Intended Parents” – A Model Brief’ 
(2000) 2 Georgetown Journal  of Gender and the Law 29). For an argument that intent-based or functional 
parenting recognition for lesbian parents cannot be applied to gay male parents conceiving through surrogacy, 
see: Susan Frelich Appleton, ‘Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex 
Couples Era’ (2006) 86 Boston University Law Review 227. 
141 Polikoff has consistently argued that such agreements should be enforceable; her position being that private 
ordering ‘is preferable to a one-size-fits-all approach to family structure’: see Nancy Polikoff, ‘Breaking the 
Link  Between  Biology  and  Parental  Rights  in  Planned  Lesbian  Families:  When  Semen  Donors  are  not 
Fathers’(2000) 2 Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law 57 at 69. See also Paula Ettelbrick, ‘Our Common 
Humanity: Vermont’s Leading Role in Forging a New Basis for Family Recognition’ (2000) 2 Georgetown 
Journal of Gender and the Law 135. However, Polikoff and Ettelbrick’s arguments favouring enforceable 
agreements are based in the US context in which sperm donors may have pre-existing legal status as parents 
(while under the model proposed here they do not) and where parental status often exclusively determines 
standing to seek contact (which under the model proposed here, as elsewhere in the world, it does not). 
142 Alternately, Richard Storrow argues that an expansive approach to functional parenthood can and should take 
into account expressions of intent made before birth: see above note 47 at 640. 
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2.  The biological father (whether known or unknown) is not a parent if assisted 
conception is used. 
 
 
These presumptions deliberately centre the mother-led family form reflecting the 
widespread reality of mothers undertaking the vast majority of caregiving work and 
responsibility for children, even in lesbian-led family forms where there are known 
and involved biological fathers.143 This accords with Susan Boyd’s suggestion that in 
according parental status, ‘the social bonds between mothers and children should be 
privileged in relation to the genetic ties of a sperm donor – who carries the heavy 
cultural power of a father’.144  But a privileging of mothers does not exclude 
recognition of biological or social fathers in appropriate circumstances, as the 
presumptions are augmented by two additional elements: 
 
 




This process should require the consent of both birth mother and co-mother as the 
primary parents and entail a form of child’s best interests inquiry before according 
parental status. Additional parents need not be biologically related to the child. 
 
 
4.  The  recognition  of  other  adult-child  relationships  can  still  be  achieved  if 
necessary through a functional family analysis. 
 
 
This form of recognition need not entail full parental status, but could concern one or 
more elements of the bundle of parental rights and responsibilities, such as child 
support or contact with the child. Again this process should be informed by a child’s 
best interests inquiry. 
 
 








Consent of the co-mother 
 
143 See eg Dunne above note 59, Gartrell et all above note 61, also see evidence received by the Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, Assisted Reproductive Technology & Adoption, Final Report (2007) at 139. 
144 Boyd above note 5. 
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Functional family models proposed by Nancy Polikoff and Paula Ettelbrick (and the 
de facto parent analysis undertaken in many US cases) have centred inquiry on the 
consent of the birth mother in sharing parental status with the co-mother.145 In 
contrast, I suggest an approach that makes the co-mother’s consent the focus of 
inquiry.146    This is conceptually important: it is not about the birth mother giving 
rights to the co-mother, it is about a shared enterprise undertaken by both women. 
This is signified by the co-mother consenting to be part of the conception process in 
order to  balance out  the  existing privileging of  the  perspective of  the  biological 
parent when there is inquiry into disputed intention. The birth mother’s intention is 
not irrelevant, rather it is presumed: she is attempting to conceive while in a 
relationship with someone who will, almost inevitably, undertake a significant share 
of parenting work with her, and so it is presumed that she intends to share parental 
status. This does not prevent a birth mother from having sole parental status if that 
is her true intention – but this is no longer the baseline position, and must instead be 
explicitly chosen by her. Such a birth mother would need to engage in a clear process 
in order to exclude her partner from parental status. Equally, the birth mother’s 
partner could refuse consent and avoid being ascribed parental status if she did not 










145  See Nancy Polikoff, ‘This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of 
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families (1990) 78 Georgetown Law Journal 459 at 573 
and Ettelbrick above note 132 at 547-51, 550. Shapiro above note 18 at 600, has been critical of this approach 
for continuing to grant primacy to the genetic parent. 
146 I don’t claim that a trigger of consent is full-proof because there can always be disputes of fact. For example 
there may be mistakes, deception or the withdrawal of consent during the two part conception process enabled 
by IVF (fertilisation, followed months or possibly years later, by transfer): see a series of English cases from 
heterosexual families dealing with these respective scenarios analysed by Sally Sheldon in the  following 
articles: ‘Reproductive Technologies and the Legal Determination of Fatherhood’ (2005) 13 Feminist Legal 
Studies 349; ‘Gender Equality and Reproductive Decision-Making’ (2004) 12 Feminist Legal Studies 303; 
‘Fragmenting Fatherhood: The Regulation of Reproductive Technologies’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 523. 
147 For an example of this in a heterosexual context, see Jane Doe and John Doe v Alberta (2007) 35 RFL (6th) 
265. The parties cohabited in a settled intimate relationship during which they agreed that the woman would 
have a child through assisted conception with an anonymous sperm donor but the man would not be a parent to 
the child. The parties jointly sought to put this agreement into binding effect. The Alberta Court of Appeal held 
that the man’s lack of consent to being a parent meant that parenting presumptions in Alberta law did not apply 
to ascribe parental status. However, even though the man was not a legal father, the court refused the orders 
sought by the parties because to do so would exclude the possibility that he could become a functional parent in 
the future, and other Alberta legislation concerned functional rather than legal parents. 
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The use of assisted conception as the dividing line between parentage presumptions 
is consistent with presumed intention: if the parties had wanted traditional parenting 
relationships and parenting rights, they probably would have conceived in traditional 
ways, whereas deliberately using another method of conception signifies a different 
intention.148  The setting of assisted conception, for example whether it occurs in a 
formal setting such as a clinic process or informally at home, does not have any legal 








The conclusive presumption is based on the premise that biology alone does not 
make men (or women for that matter, such as egg donors) parents. Lesbian-led 
families  formed  through  assisted  conception  are  families  of  intention  in  which 
biology is not determinative of individuals’ relationships with each other. Parental 
status here follows the family form rather than a genetic link; the birth mother and 
co-mother  are  equally  parents.  While  the  significance  of  a  genetic  connection 
between a biological father and the child may have many possible meanings both for 
the man himself and the child,149 this is something that is to be determined by them 
through the course of their relationship (if any): a genetic link does not automatically 
accord parental status. 
 
 
I acknowledge that the effect of this presumption could be both under and over 
inclusive. The presumption may be under-inclusive because there are some lesbian– 
led families where it was clearly intended by all that the biological father be a sperm 
donor, but who for a variety of reasons still conceived through sex.150 It is also over- 
inclusive for the few lesbian-led families where it is intended by all that the biological 







148  I differ here from Nancy Polikoff who centres binding agreements such that they override the method of 
conception in severing parental rights from a biological father even when the conception took place through sex: 
see Polikoff above note 141 at 58-59. 
149 See Maggie Kirkman, ‘Genetic Connection and Relationships in Narratives of Donor-Assisted Conception’ 
(2004) 2 Australian Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society 1. 
150 See eg Re D [2006] EWHC 2; ND v BM (2003) 31 Fam LR 22. 
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rare, and can be dealt with through opt-in mechanisms to transfer, or grant, 
additional parental status. 151 
 
 




It is important to stress that the proposed model does not mean that there can only 
ever be two legal parents,152 or that involved biological fathers, or men intended to be 




More parents, or other significant adult roles, can be added through other processes 
that are flexible and adapted to their individual needs, which may include: second (or 
third and fourth) parent adoption for full parental status or consent orders granting 
various forms of shared parental responsibility. These forms of recognition should be 
augmented  with  an  approach  to  child-related  disputes  that  is  able  to  preserve 
existing functional relationships that are of importance to the child, regardless of 
legal status or biological connection. Thus I suggest that this model does not close off 
inquiry into the multiplicity of family forms that fall outside of its scope. Nor does it 
assume that family forms are eternal and unchanging: lesbians and gay men may 
also form step-families, or have relationships that evolve in unexpected ways over 
time. An intention-based parenting presumption model works in conjunction with 
the functional family model, which can then be used to adapt to varied family forms 
or changing family needs. 
 
 
Fiona Kelly has warned that a multi-parent model of family, while appealing because 
of its ability to respond to diversity of family forms and break with hetero-normative 
family models of dual parenting, may in fact draw on fathers’ rights ideology to 
further a patriarchal family model in which fathers are imposed by courts on lesbian- 




151  So for example in the Ontario case of AA v BB [2007] OJ No 2 the same result would be reached of three 
legal parents, but under this model it would be the biological father and not the co-mother who must seek opt-in 
recognition with the consent of the presumed legal parents. 
152  See Fiona Kelly, ‘Nuclear Norms or Fluid Families? Incorporating Lesbian and Gay Parents and their 
Children into Canadian Family Law’ (2004) 21 Canadian Journal of Family Law 133. 
153 Ibid. See also Shelley Gavigan, ‘Equal Families, Equal Parents, Equal Spouses, Equal Marriage: The Case of 
the Missing Patriarch’ (2006) 33 Supreme Court Law Review 317. 
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help to shift judicial understandings of family such that if and when a functional 
family analysis is undertaken regarding other adults, the reification of genetic ties 
and gendered parenting highlighted in earlier discussion would not continue. 
 
 
It is important to remember that the presumed parent model does not provide ‘the 
answer’ to many, or even most, child-related disputes: rather it provides a starting 
point, a relatively level, predictable, equitable and lesbian-centred point from which 
disputes can be addressed. Parental status brings a bundle of rights, obligations and 
presumptions which can be modified or adapted. ‘Who is a parent?’ is a starting 
point addressing who has responsibility for a child’s welfare and financial support, 
and may also address the distribution of parental responsibility after separation 
(previously this followed residence but jurisdictions such as Australia and the UK 
now presume that such responsibility remains shared by the parents). It does not 
prevent non-parents from having parental responsibility, nor does it stop parents 
from being deprived of it, in appropriate circumstances. ‘Who is a parent?’ is only 
ever the beginning and not the end of any properly child-centred inquiry into who a 
child should live with and how to structure any contact arrangements. 
 
 
A presumed parental status for lesbian co-mothers is not entirely unknown. Indeed it 
is gaining ground; versions of this general approach have been adopted in recent 
years in three state and territories in Australia154 and five provinces in Canada,155 and 
in addition are now in place in New Zealand,156  South Africa157  and New Jersey.158 
(There are of course considerable jurisdictional variations, often depending upon 
sperm  donor’s  legal  status  which  has  depended  on  whether  they  are  known  or 
unknown or whether conception took place in a clinical setting.159) Many of these 
 
 
154 See Artificial Conception Act 1985 (WA) s 6A;  Status of Children Act 1978 (NT) 5DA; Parentage Act 2004 
(ACT) s 8(4), discussed in Jenni Millbank, above note 98. This approach has also recently been recommended 
in the Australian state of Victoria, above note 143, recommendations 72-78. 
155 See the Human Rights claims: AA v New Brunswick (Department of Family and Community Services) [2004] 
NBHRBID No 4 and Gill v Murray [2001] BCHRTD No 34; as well as the Charter challenges in Alberta and 
Ontario: Fraess  v Alberta (Minister of Justice and Attorney General) [2005] AJ No 1665; MDR v Ontario 
(Deputy Registrar General) [2006] OJ No 2268. In addition this approach has been enshrined in legislation in 
Quebec and Manitoba: Vital Statistics Act, CCSM c V60, s 3(6); Quebec Civil Code art 538. 
156 Status of Children Act 1969 (NZ) s 18. 
157 See J  v Director-General, Department of Home Affairs (2003) 5 BCLR 463. 
158 See above note 134. 
159 See eg discussion of the US situation in Polikoff above note 141 at 63-69. Note that reforms to UK law to 
grant ‘agreed parenthood’ status to co-mothers from birth will, if passed, only apply to lesbian couples who 
conceive using a licensed facility, not those who conceive at home:  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 
2007 Cls 41-45. 
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reforms have proceeded under an equal treatment approach, analogising co-mothers 
with the position of non-biological parents in heterosexual families. There is much 
appeal in such an approach, which I am not necessarily criticising - but it has 
produced very little engagement with the underlying principles or discussion of the 
‘fit’ in its application to lesbian-led families. Here I have attempted to justify the 
presumed second parent approach as one that most closely embodies (the majority 
of) mothers’ family formation intentions.160 In addition, I argue that both intention 
and family function may require additional, adaptive, recognition measures to 







Functional family analysis has achieved an enormous amount for lesbian and gay 
family forms in recent decades, supporting claims to both formal and informal status 
for partner and parenting relationships. Functional family claims have drawn heavily 
upon sociological literature about family forms, and often (though not exclusively) 
reflect critical and feminist concerns that legal recognition of relationships should be 
egalitarian, flexible and adaptive. 
 
 
I argue here that a form of presumed second parent recognition is necessary to 
preface and ground, but not entirely replace, the functional family model. While 
functional family should work to resolve intra-lesbian and donor versus mother 
disputes, the case law demonstrates that it has not done so, or has only done so at 
unacceptable  cost  –  cases  discussed  in  this  article  in  which  co-mothers  were 
‘successful’ in establishing de facto parental status commonly involved three or four 
 
years of litigation. A final observation on the intra-lesbian cases: it struck me 
profoundly on reading them for the first  time  en  masse that  the great majority 




160 In her recent analysis of the Canadian cases and discussion of sociological literature on family forms Susan 
Boyd also reaches this conclusion, above note 5. 
161  The interim proposals of the Victorian Law Reform Commission in Australia come close to meeting all of 
these needs: proposing automatic parental status to the co-mother, in addition to existing law providing for the 
possibility of dividing parental responsibility among a number of adults and a new method of multi-parent 
adoption requiring the consent of both mothers in the post-birth period. However this latter proposal was 
dropped in the final report on the basis that it was unwieldy and did not meet a demonstrated need by gay and 
lesbian families because of the generally non-residential role of biological fathers: see VLRC above note 154 at 
138-139. 
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of the length of their relationship prior to that point. While this early stage of 
parenting is obviously a stressful (and sleepless) one for most people, I am left 
wondering about the extent to which a lack of legal protection, social recognition and 
certainty around the co-mother’s role has contributed to these outcomes. While 
recognition models for lesbian parents based on intention may appear to be parent 
rather than child-centred, as Susan Boyd notes, there are strong arguments that such 
presumptions are in fact highly beneficial to children because, for example, children 
benefit  from  greater  certainty,  more  clearly  defined  familial  ties  and  the  lesser 




















































162 Boyd above note 5. 
